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LIBYA: A two-week internal crisis has been resolved by Colonel Qadhafi's appointment of a pre-dominantly civilian cabinet with Major Abd As-Salam Jallud, a leading Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) member, as prime minister.

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The crisis arose over the question of whether the new cabinet would consist entirely of civilians, according to press reports. [Colonel Qadhafi, the president of the RCC, has long hoped to phase out the RCC gradually and replace it with a governmental structure similar to those in the sister confederation states of Egypt and Syria.] RCC members resisted changes that might separate them from their power base in the army and insisted on being represented in the cabinet. After Qadhafi retaliated by sulking in seclusion, Egyptian officials, including President Sadat, apparently arranged a compromise by which at least two RCC members were to hold the portfolios of defense and interior. They, together with Prime Minister Jallud, would also retain their military rank.

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Seven of the 16 civilian ministers announced so far are holdovers from the previous cabinet, and two others--the foreign minister and the planning minister--are seasoned professionals in their respective fields who are taking over newly created ministries; Qadhafi had formerly handled foreign affairs without holding the portfolio. [The only puzzling appointment in the cabinet is that of the defense minister which will be retained by Qadhafi himself, despite the fact that the prime minister presumably will be responsible to him as head of the RCC.]

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Although recent Libyan cabinets have been the creatures of the ruling RCC, the new cabinet may soon assume more responsibility than the former one. Qadhafi's plan has been to establish a responsible

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[cabinet and a national legislature before author-
izing elections that would make him the Libyan pres-
ident and lead to the abolition of the RCC. Tradi-
tional Libyan xenophobia and fear of eventually
losing their positions, however, will incline minor
RCC members to resist any plan that they believe
might bring Libya closer to a possible merger with
Egypt.] 3

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GHANA: The government has thwarted a coup designed to restore former prime minister Busia and the disbanded Progress Party to power.

The government has issued a statement charging "disgruntled businessmen" and officials of the former Progress Party with an attempt to overthrow the government. The statement gave assurances that everyone connected with the plot would immediately be brought to trial.

The coup attempt is only one of several real or imaginary coup plots under investigation. The fact that it was nipped in the bud may prove to be a temporary deterrent to other conspirators. All indications are, however, that the government is in serious trouble and has a long way to go before gaining the support it needs to govern effectively. Rumors of coup plotting and dissatisfaction with the government's performance will probably continue.

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BURUNDI: The new cabinet appointed by President Micombero on 14 July is not likely to bring an early end to the tribal slaughter that has been going on for the past ten weeks.

Micombero dismissed his previous cabinet on 29 April just prior to the outbreak of a short-lived insurrection by exiled Hutu dissidents. Since then, the ruling Tutsi minority has waged a nationwide campaign of reprisals against the Hutu majority.

The new government, however, is weighted in favor of Tutsi moderates who would like to see an end to the bloodshed. As a conciliatory gesture, Micombero also appointed two or three Hutus. Nevertheless, tribal and factional bitterness, traditionally strong in Burundi, has been so intensified in recent months that a long break-in period probably will be needed before the government can begin to restore stability.

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LAW OF THE SEA: The session of the UN Seabeds Committee which begins today may determine whether a Law of the Sea conference will be held in 1973.

The final decision on a conference will be made this fall by the UN General Assembly, but, if the Seabeds Committee cannot agree on a list of issues by then, the chances of the conference being held next year are slim. Recent discussions have centered on a list drawn up last March by 56 of the 91 members of the committee and subsequent "compromises" suggested by the committee chairman. Two of the issues are so troublesome, however, that no agreement has been reached on how to word them in the agenda.

One of these issues is the economic rights of states beyond the territorial waters they claim. The other is the right of free passage through straits. A few states have been trying to delay progress on these items in hopes of obtaining more support for their positions. Several Latin American countries desire, at a minimum, sovereign rights over ocean resources up to 200 miles from their coasts. Because of its interest in the Straits of Gibraltar, Spain has taken the lead in pressing for substantial control by coastal authorities over transit through straits enclosed by the proposed extension of the territorial sea to 12 miles.

Most members of the Seabeds Committee, however, will be trying hard for agreement at this session on the list of issues, believing that little can be gained from postponement of the Law of the Sea conference. They particularly fear that delay would lead to the conclusion of unilateral or regional arrangements that would further complicate the process of reaching an international agreement. Recent Latin American and Mediterranean efforts have shown that even a consensus on a regional basis is not easy to attain, however. While agreement on the agenda

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might facilitate eventual resolution of the substantive issues involved, the Law of the Sea conference--if it is held next year--is still likely to be a contentious and drawn-out affair.

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